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Sir,
Dingli et al report the use of evolutionary game theory to
improve our understanding of cancer dynamics. They study the
interaction between malignant and normal cells in a multiple
myeloma (MM) model (Dingli et al, 2009). I hope to give a
simplified explanation of the underlying concepts to a non-
mathematical physician, as well as pose some challenges to the
authors.
Game theory has fascinating potential when applied to the field
of medicine (Tarrant et al, 2004). At a fundamental level, the field
of game theory evolved from the mathematical exploration of
conflict situations between rational entities that make predictable
and reproducible choices (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).
Subsequent mathematical formulae are derived from and are
dependent on these prerequisites.
The fact that both players make reproducible and rational
choices allows for the prediction of equilibrium states in ‘games’
that are played repeatedly over time. This equilibrium state is the
steady state in which the cumulative returns (payoff) of both
‘players’ from repeated interactions are maximised. In game
theory, this payoff is known as a Util. There can be many
possible equilibrium states for any one game; conversely,
there is always at least one equilibrium state for any game that
is finite and allows mixed strategies (alternating strategies are
possible).
The idea of an equilibrium state has been successfully applied to
evolutionary theory, most notably in the development of evolu-
tionary stable strategies (ESSs) by George Price and John Maynard
Smith (Maynard Smith, 1973). An ESS is essentially a strategy
with a symmetric equilibrium state, except that it is also more
stable than any possible alternative strategy to the game. This
requirement provides the necessary evolutionary pressure against
invasion from other competing strategies that would destabilise
this equilibrium.
Another important concept in evolutionary game theory is that
of ‘Fitness’. Fitness is commonly described as the average number
of extra offspring that carry a specific trait (gene, replicator) into
the next generation as a result of the trait being used in the current
generation. The proportion of extra offspring increases at a rate
proportional to the fraction of the population currently hosting
the trait and also to the difference in fitness between the trait in
question and the average fitness of all other competing traits in the
population. In terms of the game, traits can be seen as strategies of
play and fitness as the payoff (Utils).
In cancer dynamics, such ESSs are attractive heuristics in that
they can theoretically be used to understand and thus potentially
manipulate the process of cancer growth. One can potentially
predict and effect improved survival by changing the strategies
and payoffs (fitness) of the cancer ‘game’. This innovative paper
attempts to do just that. The conclusion reached is that by
reducing the fitness of malignant cells (their payoff) compared
with the fitness of normal cells, one can potentially eradicate the
cancer cell by natural selection.
Some basic game theory examples are useful in exploring this
concept of reduced fitness. A classic example of a game model for
evolution is the ‘Hawk–Dove Prisoners Dilemma Game’. In this
game, two birds drawn from the same species compete for a
valuable resource. Two traits in the population make their host
either passive (a dove) or aggressive (a hawk). A dove surrenders
the entire resource to a hawk, two doves share the resource
equally, and two hawks fight (which has reduced fitness owing to
the dangers of fighting).
This game has logical applicability to cancer dynamics in that
the aggressive malignant cell (hawk) competes with a passive
normal cell (dove) for biological energy. We can numerically
express such strategies by their fitness (Utils). Two interacting
dove cells have a hypothetical fitness of 2 Utils each (sharing), 1
Util each if both are hawks (fighting), and 4 to 0 Utils if one player
is a hawk and the other is a dove, respectively. The resulting game
theory ESS for this interaction is that in which all players become
hawks, which seems contradictory as they would be more fit if
they were both doves (Figure 1). This apparent contradiction is a
fundamental concept in game theory. Thus, the appearance of even
a tiny fraction of hawks dooms the doves to extinction. A similar
result was seen by Dingli et al when they chose a value of b41 for
the fitness of the interaction between a myeloma cell (MM) and an
osteoclast (OC). They found that the normal equilibrium was then
disturbed by introducing one MM cell into a population of 10
10
normal cells (see their Figure 2 (Dingli et al, 2009)). These
scenarios resemble the end result of untreated cancer, in which
malignant cells overcome normal cells. Therefore, backward
induction suggests that this is a reasonable mathematical model
for cancer dynamics.
The hypothesised conclusion of the Dingli paper suggests attempt-
ing to reduce the fitness of malignant cells (hawks). This game Published online 17 November 2009
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‘Hawk–Dove Chicken’ game. Here, the payoff for being a hawk is
less, as even a slight injury from fighting is likely to be a severe
handicap, leading to less fitness. The payoffs in this game
are thus 2 Utils each if both are doves, 1 Util each if both are
hawks, and 4 to 0 Utils if a hawk plays a dove. We have decreased
the fitness of two hawks interacting by 2 Utils each. Such a
decrease in fitness yields a different ESS in which 1
3 of the cells
are normal (dove) and 2
3 are malignant (hawk) (Figure 2). In the
context of Dingli et al’s paper, such a reduction could potentially
be affected by therapies reducing b. This example also underscores
the importance of targeted strategies that reduce the fitness
of malignant cells alone, without any effect on the fitness of normal
cells. New biological therapies have this potential and have
been leading to improved outcomes (Weisberg et al, 2006).
It is clear that such a simplified approach can be developed
further and be used to better understand the dynamics of
malignant cell interactions with normal cells. Dingli et al attempt
to demonstrate a possible eradication of MM cells by reducing the
fitness of the interaction between OCs and MM cells (b), such that
this was less fit than the interaction between osteoblasts (OBs) and
OC (see their Figure 3 (Dingli et al, 2009)). They also demonstrate
that altering the fitness numbers for the interaction between OBs
and MM cells (d) will affect the time needed to reach the new
equilibrium between OCs and MM cells, and is thus important in
prognosis (see their Figure 2D (Dingli et al, 2009)). These ideas
have clear merit.
However, game theory has a number of problems when applied
to oncology. From a prediction perspective, the actual ratio of
normal to malignant cells that evolves in treatment-driven ESS
depends on the fitness numbers artificially incorporated into the
game for any particular strategy. It is therefore purely theoretical.
It may be possible to determine the effect of a therapy on
malignant cell fitness by extrapolating backwards from the
observed ratio of malignant cells to normal cells after treatment;
however, this is far beyond our current technologies.
Furthermore, whether a cancer cell is a ‘game player’ that can
ever make rational choices leading to an equilibrium state (or ESS)
is unclear. Immortalised cells develop and do not interact ‘rationally’
with normal cells to maximise the combined payoff. Their behaviour
is in no way similar to that of rational evolutionary behaviour. They
pass on mutated genes to mostly clonal offspring until all of the
desired resource is consumed and they then die along with their
host. This lack of rational behaviour seems to fundamentally limit
their applicability to game theory mathematics.
Moreover, the idea of reducing the fitness of malignant cells is
essentially an attempt to reverse the processes that made them
cancer cells in the first place. Cancer cells can be divided into
proliferative cells with a deregulated increase in cell turnover, or
into antiapoptotic cells that are resistant to cell death. A priori,
both situations lead to increased fitness over normal cells. Any ESS
reached by treatment can only at best achieve an ESS in which
normal cells coexist with malignant cells as seen in the ‘Hawk–
Dove Chicken Game’. This ESS will always destabilise once new
mutations develop in malignant cells over time, which increases
their fitness over normal cells.
Therefore, it seems that the only way for normal cells to win
the deadly ‘game’ of cancer is to exclude malignant cells from the
game altogether! Further work by researchers such as Dingli et al
is needed to resolve some of these current paradoxes.
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Figure 1 Prisoners’ dilemma. The circled number is the fittest strategy
for a given interaction. The interaction in which both strategies are circled is
the equilibrium state (or in evolutionary parlance, the ESS). In this case,
there is one best strategy (a pure ESS) and it is hawk–hawk. The strategy
choices for player 1 are in bold and those for player 2 are in italics.
Player 2 
Dove Hawk
All Hawk 
 Dove 
Player 1 
Hawk 
All Dove
2
2
4
0
0
4
–1
–1
ESS= 2/3 Hawk 
Figure 2 Chicken. In this case, there are two best strategies (a mixed
ESS). The equilibrium is reached when 2
3 are hawk and 1
3 are dove. This ratio
is a consequence of the numbers used for fitness in the model and is
hypothetical but informative. The strategy choices for player 1 are in bold
and those for player 2 are in italics.
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